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Moving beyond the urban/rural cleavage: Measuring values and policy preferences across residential zones in Canada

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ABSTRACT

Despite urban forms becoming more varied, analysts continue to use a dichotomous urban/rural distinction when examining political attitudes. Using geocoding, our analysis of original survey data adopts a four-residential-zone approach to exploring Canadian political values and policy preferences: inner city, suburban, small urban, and rural. We find that an ideological polarization between inner city residents on the left and the rest of Canadians on the right emerges and is most pronounced when it comes to values related to new ideology and policy preferences concerning taxation, moral policies, and spending on social assistance. Within large urban centers specifically, suburbanites are more socially conservative than are inner city residents, while divisions between the two groups are smaller with respect to economic issues and the welfare state. We suggest that researchers should replace the binary category of urban/rural for political analyses with a residential zone approach in order to better capture the complexity of contemporary urbanity.

Studies of elections and political attitudes in Western countries typically adopt an urban/rural binary lens when it comes to the place of residence of respondents. This theoretical distinction harkens back to traditional notions of the “city” and the “country” found both in seminal social science research of the 20th century (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) and in novels describing typical urban or rural experiences such as *Ulysses* and *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*. This lens made sense when the populations of Western countries were more evenly divided between city residents and those living in rural settings and when cities were smaller and more self-contained. However, Western countries have become considerably more urbanized and the urban forms in which their citizens now live have become more varied. Large metropolitan areas have grown in size and include vast swaths of outlying suburbs alongside dense downtown cores, while a number of smaller cities with populations between 10,000 and 100,000 exist quite separately from both large population centers and rural areas.

Research suggests that the characteristics of the environment in which one’s primary dwelling is situated, known as residential zone, can be politically relevant. Given the growing diversity of urban forms, it is important to re-evaluate the contemporary validity of assuming a traditional binary urban/rural cleavage in political analyses. Using Canada as a case study, this article explores the differences and similarities in the political values and policy preferences of Canadians living in different types of urbanity compared to Canadians living in rural areas.¹ Political values refer to citizens’ beliefs about fundamental aspects of politics, such as whether or not the state has a responsibility to provide a decent standard living for all citizens. Policy preferences refer to individuals’ positions concerning specific public policy options, such as a citizen’s feeling about the legalization of same-sex marriage. Often, researchers divide political values and policy preferences into the categories of new ideology and old

ideology. New ideology refers to postmaterialist issues such as the environment, feminism, social conservatism, and discrimination against visible minorities as opposed to old ideology that was exclusively concerned with class conflict, economic issues, and wealth redistribution through the welfare state (Kitschelt & Hellems, 1990; Nevitte, 1996; Nevitte, Bakvis, & Gibbins, 1989). Whether they reflect new ideology or old ideology, the political values and policy preferences of citizens are undoubtedly an important part of contemporary political analysis. In particular, they can be related to support for the general policy direction of governments and for specific policy initiatives, as well as being used to analyze vote choice and the level of legitimacy of political actors (candidates and political parties).²

Analyses of political attitudes have generally relied upon a binary distinction between urban and rural, but in more recent research there have been attempts to divide up analyses into three categories (inner city, suburban, and rural). Our study extends such analysis and uses geocoding³ to divide original Canadian survey data into four different residential zones: inner city, suburban, small urban, and rural. Our analysis suggests an ideological polarization between inner city residents on the left and the rest of Canadians on the right, one that is most pronounced when it comes to values related to new ideology considerations and policy preferences concerning taxation, moral policies, and spending on social assistance. Based on this, we argue that the category of *urban* has become increasingly fractured as a concept for analytical use, and suggest that researchers should consider abandoning a binary urban/rural lens when it comes to examining political attitudes and voter behavior and instead rely on measurements that better reflect the varied nature of urban forms.

Residential zone, values, and policy preferences

International research on vote choice and political values that moves beyond the traditional urban-rural dichotomy suggests that an inner city/suburban political cleavage exists. Studies in the United Kingdom have shown that London suburbanites prefer the Conservative Party over other political parties (Biel, 1972; Cox, 1967; Johnston, Jones, Sarker, Propper, & Bolster, 2004); research finds that Australian suburban areas are more likely to vote for conservative parties (Duncan & Epps, 1992; Johnston & Forrest, 1985); De Maesschalck (2009, 2011) finds that suburban areas in Belgium generally vote for more conservative parties and are more likely to display anti-foreigner attitudes than inner city areas; and Stroebel (2012) shows that, in most cases, suburbanites in Switzerland, Germany, Holland, and France are more likely to vote for conservative parties and more likely to hold traditional views about women's role in raising children.

The inner city/suburban cleavage in political behavior has been most thoroughly studied in the United States. Since the 1950s, researchers have established a clear pattern of suburban areas voting more heavily in favor of Republican candidates and identifying more with the Republican Party, even after controlling for sociodemographic differences (Caswell, 2009; Gainsborough, 2001, 2005; Greenstein & Wolfinger, 1958; Lubell, 1956; McKee & Shaw, 2003; McKee & Teigen, 2009; Murauskas, Archer, & Shelley, 1988; Stiles & Schwab, 2011; Walker, 2013; Zikmund, 1967). This trend has led to fears over increasing geographical polarization—that is, the self-sorting of individuals into neighborhoods containing a high percentage of like-minded residents (Bishop, 2008)—even if empirical evidence for such polarization is less than convincing (Abrams & Fiorina, 2012; Glaeser & Ward, 2006).

Researchers have been less inclined to examine the values and policy preferences of U.S. suburbanites compared to their inner city counterparts. The exception is Gainsborough (2001, 2005), who found that suburbanites are more likely to want to decrease government spending, particularly on programs to aid the poor and African Americans, than are inner city residents. Building on Gainsborough's research, Williamson found that "residence in an older neighborhood and in a neighborhood with multimodal transportation systems are both shown to be strong, significant predictors of holding more liberal political views" (2008, p. 917). As such, he concludes that the relationship between suburbanization and conservatism identified by Gainsborough may somehow

be tied up with differences in community characteristics such as modes of daily transportation and the age of the architecture and infrastructure.

For our purposes it is useful to closely consider the Canadian literature. Canadian political behavior research is quite clear that where one lives is an important determinant of vote choice and political attitudes. The foremost cleavage pertaining to place of residence in Canada that has been studied is that of region or province. The basic regional configuration is usually either five regions (British Columbia, Prairies, Ontario, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada) or four regions (Western Canada, Ontario, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada). Even though there are some dissenting voices (Blake, 1978; Clarke, LeDuc, Jenson, & Pammett, 1979; Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, & Pammett, 1984), several studies on vote choice have shown that voters sharing the same social background characteristics vote differently from one region to another (Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau, & Nevitte, 2002; Gidengil, Blais, Everitt, Fournier, & Nevitte, 2006; Gidengil, Nevitte, Blais, Everitt, & Fournier, 2012; Johnston, 2012, pp. 165–169; Kay & Perrella, 2012, pp. 128–129, Nevitte et al., 2000; Schwartz, 1974). Further, with the exception of Clarke, Pammett, and Stewart (2002) and Ornstein and Stevenson (1999), there are a number of studies that illustrate residents of different regions and provinces have different policy preferences, political values, and general political attitudes (Anderson, 2011; Gidengil, Blais, Nevitte, & Nadeau, 1999; McGrane & Berdahl, 2013; Nevitte & Kanji, 2004, 2008; Simeon & Elkins, 1980).

For the most part, studies to date include a dichotomous urban/rural variable, which is generally found to be not significant, alongside their measures pertaining to region and province. Only a limited number of Canadian studies have moved beyond the urban/rural dichotomy by examining differences in vote choice, political values, and policy preferences based on the population of the respondent's municipality. Cutler and Jenkins (2002) use four population categories to analyze 1993 Canadian Election Study (CES) data: cities over 100,000, cities between 10,000 and 100,000, small towns between 1,000 and 10,000, and rural areas where the population is less than 1,000. Generally, they find that residents of cities with populations over 100,000 are less socially conservative than residents of municipalities with populations under 100,000. Turcotte (2001a, 2001b) and Cochrane and Perrella (2013) create continuums of eight and five categories, respectively, based on the size of the population of the respondent's municipality. Turcotte finds few notable differences among the categories he creates on questions concerning the freedom of expression and the right to assembly but does find that the residents of Vancouver, Montreal, and Toronto are less socially conservative than other Canadians. Cochrane and Perrella find little evidence that residents of larger cities are more favorable to state intervention in the economy than residents of small cities and rural residents, with the notable exception of residents living in Manitoba. As these studies do not distinguish between the inner city and suburban areas of these municipalities, they continue the assumption that there is a uniformity of values and policy preferences within Canada's largest cities.

Alan Walks (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007) is the only researcher who has examined differences concerning vote choice, values, and policy preferences between the residents of the inner cities and suburbs of large Canadian cities. Walks closely examined vote choice and political attitudes among residents of different parts of Toronto-Hamilton, Vancouver, and Montreal. In a 2004 article, he constructs three urban zones in these cities (inner city, inner suburbs, outer suburbs) as contiguous bands of census tracts that were developed during one of three eras (before 1945, 1946–1970, after 1970). Using data from the 1965, 1984, and 2000 CES, he finds that outer suburban residence is linked to not only voting for parties on the right but to holding right-of-center attitudes such as supporting capital punishment, the reduction of taxes, and business power at the expense of unions, as well as believing that the welfare state makes people less willing to look after themselves. He also finds that inner city residents are more likely to vote for left of center parties and are more likely to support union power and government spending on social programs while being less open to cutting taxes or privatizing hospitals. In a 2005 article, Walks simplifies his three zones into two zones (inner city, suburban) and uses federal electoral returns between 1945 and 1997 to demonstrate that the shift in vote choice of suburbanites toward right-of-center parties did not happen until the 1980s.

Walks has also used qualitative analysis to examine differing political attitudes within a split suburban-inner city neighborhood in Toronto (2006) and has written on how to properly define a suburban zone for analyses of political behavior in Canada's three largest urban regions (2007). While his work advances the study of residential zones and politics, it is limited to three Canadian metropolitan areas in two provinces and does not compare the attitudes of inner city and suburban residents to the attitudes of residents of rural or small urban areas. Further, due to data constraints, he focuses on vote choice, with only a relatively small number of indicators related to values and policy preferences that do not include considerations of new ideology.

While gaps remain, previous research does give us a rough guide of what to expect regarding political values and policy preferences across residential zones in Canada. A consistent finding is that rural residents are more socially conservative than residents of large Canadian cities (Bittner, 2007; Cutler & Jenkins, 2002; Turcotte, 2001b). While Walks (2004) does not deal with social conservatism, he does find that suburbanites in Canada's three largest cities are more conservative than inner city residents on economic topics and issues relating to social programs. Combining these insights, we anticipate that inner city residents will lean to the left on both economic and social topics, while suburbanites would be socially progressive and economically conservative. Specifically, it is possible that both inner city residents and suburbanites tend to the left on "new ideology" topics relating to gender, race, the environment, and social conservatism but diverge when it comes to "old ideology" topics like taxes, government regulation, and spending on the welfare state. Further, we anticipate that rural residents will demarcate themselves as more socially conservative than the residents of small urban, suburban, and inner city residential zones. We are unsure about the economic conservatism of rural residents; while Cochrane and Perrella (2013) did not find differences between urban and rural residents on a single question measurement of feeling towards state intervention in the economy, Gidengil et al. (2012, pp. 22–23) did find a relationship between living in a rural area and supporting the quite economically conservative Reform, Canadian Alliance, and Conservative Parties. Finally, given the lack of previous research, we have no particular expectations regarding the attitudes of residents of small cities when it comes to questions of either old ideology or new ideology.

Data and methods

The Comparative Provincial Elections Project (CPEP) survey data were collected following provincial elections in all Canadian provinces between October 2011 and September 2014.⁴ Respondents were randomly selected from a randomly recruited web panel that supports confidence intervals and error testing. In smaller provinces, where the web panel was unable to complete the required interviews, interactive voice response-to-web methodology (based on a random digit dial sample that was drawn from a dual landline-cellular frame) was used to complete the required numbers of interviews. The data for each province were weighted by gender, age, education, and region according to census data. CPEP data overcome many of the limitations that constrained Walks' work. With large sample sizes in each province, the CPEP data allow for a more fulsome inquiry into political attitudes and residential zones than was previously possible. We are able to examine differences in suburban and inner city attitudes in all of Canada's large urban centers as well as comparing attitudes of these inner city and suburban residents to Canadians living in smaller cities and rural areas. Further, the CPEP survey includes numerous measures of policy preferences and political values, including those related to new ideology.

In our effort to move beyond the urban/rural dichotomy, an important consideration is how to differentiate between rural residents and residents from the types of urban forms we are examining: inner city, suburban, and small urban. There is no single, universally accepted definition of a suburb or an inner city (Harris, 2004, pp. 18–20; Ley & Frost, 2006, p. 194). When researchers use census data for their analyses, the definition of a suburb tends to be country-specific since each country's census has different conventions. In Canadian research, definitions have been based on the age of housing stock; the density of housing; proximity to the central business district; the prevalence of car

use, and home ownership; or the frequency of attached and semi-attached housing (Charney, 2005; Gordon & Janzen, 2013; Shearmur & Coffey, 2002; Walks, 2004, 2005).

For our study, the definition of a suburban zone was inspired by a series of Statistics Canada articles that distinguishes census tracts based on their distance from the census tract that contains city hall (Keown, 2008; Turcotte, 2008a, 2008b, 2009). The authors of those articles drew concentric rings around the census tract of the city hall of the central municipality of the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) that bears the name of the CMA (an example would be Nathan Phillips Square in Toronto). A CMA, as defined by Statistics Canada, "must have a total population of at least 100,000 of which 50,000 or more live in the core."⁵ The rings were drawn 0 to 5 kilometers, 5 to 9 kilometers, and so on. Depending on the size of the CMA, the outer rings are defined as suburban (further broken down into inner suburbs, outer suburbs, and urban fringe) while the inner rings are defined as urban.

According to the 2011 Canadian census, approximately 69% of Canadians or 23 million people were living in one of the country's thirty-three CMAs. Using geomapping techniques based on self-reported postal codes, we define inner city residents as respondents living within a 10-km radius of city hall for a large CMA (population over 500,000) or within a 5-km radius of city hall for a small CMA (population under 500,000), and we define a suburban resident as a respondent living outside of a 10-km radius of city hall for a large CMA (population over 500,000) or outside of a 5-km radius of city hall for a small CMA (population under 500,000). We chose distance from the center of the CMA because a defining feature of contemporary Canadian federal and provincial elections is that the ridings located close to the inner core of CMAs have voted more heavily for left-of-center parties while ridings in the outlying areas of CMAs have supported right-of-center parties. Using distance from the city center allows us to replicate the inner city/suburban ideological divide that appears to be a prominent part of recent Canadian elections. While it would have been interesting to analyze inner and outer suburbs similar to the Statistics Canada definition, this method reduced the sample size in each category to the point where reliable statistical analysis was no longer possible. Further, the concept of inner and outer suburbs cannot be applied to smaller CMAs in Canada. Similarly, the inclusion of small CMAs and large CMAs in the study meant that a standardized 10-km radius could not be used for all CMAs. A standardized 10-km radius boundary between suburban and inner cities zones resulted in few residents outside of that radius in small CMAs while a standardized 5-km for large CMAs resulted in a relatively small number of residents within what would be defined as the inner city. As a compromise, a 10-km radius was chosen for large CMAs and a 5-km radius was chosen for small CMAs.

Having divided up Canada's largest cities in this manner, we then turn our attention to the 13% of Canadians (approximately 4.3 million) living within the country's 114 Census agglomerations (CAs), which are small cities with populations between 10,000 and 100,000. While these voters often play pivotal roles in provincial and federal elections, their political attitudes have yet to be studied in a systematic manner. It is our methodological contention that these Canadians live in a different type of residential environment than those living in CMAs with populations large enough to have genuine suburbs and large downtown cores. Indeed, we theorize that there are no suburban zones within Canada's CAs. Rather, each of Canada's CAs constitutes a residential zone in and of itself that has a residential environment that is unique from inner city, suburban, or rural areas. We define a small urban resident as a respondent who lives in a CA. Finally, our rural residential zone encompasses the 18% of Canadians (approximately 6 million) that the 2011 census found to live in neither a CMA or a CA. These Canadians live in communities of under 10,000 or live on farms and other types of rural residences.

Using these definitions, the CPEP sample of 8,164 was broken down as follows: inner city (1,780 respondents), suburban (2,525 respondents), small urban (1,642 respondents), rural (2,146 respondents), and unknown (71). The postal codes of respondents were essential in dividing our sample in this manner. The unknown category represents the respondents who incorrectly filled out their postal code or refused to provide it; these respondents are excluded from our analyses. We used geographic information systems (GIS) software to convert a list of respondent postal codes to

geographic coordinates that can then be assigned to one of our defined residential zones. In all but rural areas of Canada, six-digit postal codes assign an address to the city block of the residence. The use of postal codes accomplished our research goal of associating each respondent with an accurate representation of their residential location while keeping confidential their street address. ArcGIS software, in combination with DMTI street and postal code data, was used for geocoding, boundary delineation, and survey respondent assignment. In Canada, postal codes for rural areas are quite inaccurate for the purposes of establishing the location of residences. Historically, Canadian postal codes with a 0 in the second position and a 1 in the fourth position (e.g., V0H 1Z0 for Summerland, BC) were assigned to communities with fewer than 5,000 residents. All residents of such communities are assigned the same postal code without any reference to the actual location of residential home location within these communities, substantially diminishing the accuracy of postal code-only geocoding. Fortunately, for such locations, we are aggregating all residents into a single place of residence: rural.

Our dependent variables are political values and policy preferences. These two concepts come from the literature on left-right ideology in Canadian public opinion. Though there is debate about the consistency of citizens' ideologies, it is generally agreed that left-right ideology is an important organizing framework for the ways in which Canadians think about politics, and a robust literature has developed that aims to define left and right attitudes in public opinion. The earliest studies on the subject were fascinated by how the general public understood the terms left and right (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Laponce, 1970, 1972; Ogmundson, 1979), if the public could apply these terms correctly to political parties (Converse, 1964; Elkins, 1974; Lambert & Hunter, 1979), and how perceptions of left and right affect voting patterns (Kay, 1977; Weisberg & Rusk, 1970; Zipp, 1978). Noting the confusion of the public when it came to these terms, researchers began to explore the inability of citizens to understand the concepts of left and right and, subsequently, place themselves correctly on the then-standard 7-point scale (1 = *very left*, 7 = *very right*). Generally, it was found that this method of ideological self-placement was insufficient and that batteries of questions are needed to discern the degree of left and right attitudes within public opinion (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001; Gibbins & Nevitte, 1985; Lambert, 1983; Lambert, Curtis, Brown, & Kay, 1986; Lambert, Curtis, Kay, & Brown, 1988; Ornstein, Stevenson, & Williams, 1980).

Following these initial studies of left-right ideology, researchers became interested in how public opinion reflected the concerns of new ideology versus old ideology (Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990; Nevitte, 1996; Nevitte et al., 1989). The most recent examinations of left-right ideology contained in the analyses of the Canadian Election Studies respect this distinction between old and new ideology. Indeed, the most common ideological dimensions that have been examined are market liberalism (the extent to which respondents like or dislike government interference in the economy) and moral traditionalism (the extent to which respondents display traditional attitudes towards women and gays and lesbians) (for an example, see Gidengil et al., 2012, p. 40).

It must be noted that some analysts have combined what could be considered values (i.e., the respondent's underlying beliefs) with policy preferences (i.e., how a respondent feels about a specific government policy) (Ornstein & Stevenson, 1999), whereas other researchers have made a sharp distinction between values and policy preferences, arguing that the two concepts should not be conflated (Anderson, 2011, p. 448; Simeon & Blake, 1980, pp. 77–78). Our own analyses respect the distinction between political values and policy preferences to provide a more nuanced understanding of left-right ideology. Our dependent variables consist of twenty survey questions: ten questions measuring political values and ten questions measuring policy preferences. Respondents were not given an *I don't know* option on these questions, but were allowed to not answer the question by clicking the forward through the survey on their Internet browser. The respondents who decided not to answer the question are excluded from the analysis of that specific question.

Findings

To consider variations across the individual variables, we first turn to analysis of variance (ANOVA), grouping the values questions into indicators relating to old ideology and new ideology, and policy preferences questions into spending priorities and other policy topics. In discussing each indicator, we assume that the mean of the *all of Canada* category reflects the center of Canadian public opinion (national average) on these subjects. The ANOVA tests confirm that there are statistically significant differences among the means of the groups we are examining. Post-hoc analysis (Scheffé test; results available upon request) allows us to discern the groups between which the statistically significant differences emerge.

Looking first at old ideology (Table 1), it is striking that inner city residents are more left of center than other Canadians on all five indicators. Compared to the full sample mean, we find that inner city residents are left of center on every indicator while the suburban, small urban, and rural residents are to the right of center on every indicator. The only exception is small urban residents join inner city residents on the left of center when it comes to confidence in unions. When we look at specific questions, inner city residents are less pro-business and more pro-union than other Canadians, less likely to agree with statements reflecting an individualistic and economically conservative outlook, and more likely to agree that government should ensure that everyone has a decent standard of living, a statement reflecting collectivist values. An examination of the Scheffé tests reveals that the difference of means of the inner city and suburban residents are statistically significant for all old ideology questions, and the difference of means between the inner city and both small urban and rural residents was statistically significant in three of the five questions (the exceptions being pro-union and standard of living). Rural residents stood out as having statistically significant differences from all other groups on the regulation question. Beyond this, the only statistically significant difference amongst suburban, small urban, and rural residents was on the pro-unions questions, with small urban and rural residents differing.

A similar pattern is seen with respect to new ideology (Table 2), as inner city residents are markedly to the left of center compared to residents from the other three residential zones. Compared to the national average, inner city residents fall substantially to the left of center on all five indicators while suburban, small urban, and rural residents fall consistently to the right. Inner city residents are much more likely to report the existence of systematic racism and patriarchy, display higher levels of environmentalism, and display considerably less social conservatism than Canadians living in other residential zones. The Scheffé tests confirm this conclusion. There are statistically significant differences in the means of the inner city group and the means of the other three groups on every question. Once again, the differences amongst the suburban, small urban, and rural groups were few in number: all groups differed significantly from each other on the family variable, and rural and suburban residents had statistically significant differences on the Aboriginal variable.

When it comes to policy preferences regarding provincial government spending (Table 3), the “inner city versus all others” pattern remains evident, but it is less pronounced. The differences between the four residential zones are quite minimal when it comes to spending on health care and education. However, inner city residents are more likely to prefer less spending on crime and justice (a left-of-center position) than are other Canadians. The Scheffé tests illustrated that the means of the inner city group were significantly different from the means of the other groups on three of the five questions: welfare, environment, and crime and justice. There were very few differences found between the suburban, small urban, and rural groups: there were statistically significant differences among the means of suburban, small urban, and rural on health spending, and between suburban and rural on crime and justice.

The final set of questions explore policy preferences related to taxation as well as positions on moral policies and private health care, and the same pattern emerges: with the exception of corporate taxation attitudes, inner city residents are to the left of the national average while suburban, small urban, and rural residents are to the right (Table 4). Compared to other Canadians, inner city



Table 1. Means of values in four residential zones (old ideology).

Residential zone	Pro-Business: Please indicate how much confidence you have in the following institutions. Big business ... A lot of confidence: 1 Some confidence: 2 Not a lot of confidence: 3 No confidence at all: 4 Mean (SD)	Pro-Union: Please indicate how much confidence you have in the following institutions. Unions ... A lot of confidence: 1 Some confidence: 2 Not a lot of confidence: 3 No confidence at all: 4 Mean (SD)	Regulation: Government regulation stifles personal drive. Strongly agree: 1 Somewhat agree: 2 Somewhat disagree: 3 Strongly disagree: 4 Mean (SD)	Blame Themselves: People who don't get ahead should blame themselves, not the system. Strongly agree: 1 Somewhat agree: 2 Somewhat disagree: 3 Strongly disagree: 4 Mean (SD)	Standard of Living: Government should see that everyone has a decent standard of living. Strongly agree: 1 Somewhat agree: 2 Somewhat disagree: 3 Strongly disagree: 4 Mean (SD)
Inner city	2.77 (0.86), N = 1,748	2.60 (0.92), N = 1,734	2.73 (0.91), N = 1,760	2.44 (0.90), N = 1,763	1.86 (0.81), N = 1,765
Suburban	2.67 (0.87), N = 2,487	2.78 (0.95), N = 2,463	2.47 (0.89), N = 2,489	2.20 (0.88), N = 2,499	1.98 (0.84), N = 2,498
Small urban	2.70 (0.83), N = 1,607	2.63 (0.98), N = 1,612	2.42 (0.88), N = 1,612	2.27 (0.89), N = 1,616	1.97 (0.83), N = 1,618
Rural	2.70 (0.83), N = 2,091	2.71 (0.97), N = 2,069	2.32 (0.89), N = 2,094	2.24 (0.91), N = 2,110	1.97 (0.88), N = 2,111
All of Canada	2.71 (0.85), N = 8,002	2.70 (0.95), N = 7,924	2.51 (0.90), N = 8,025	2.28 (0.90), N = 8,058	1.94 (0.84), N = 8,061
F (df)	10.11 (3) ^{***}	16.69 (3) ^{***}	57.05 (3) ^{***}	26.16 (3) ^{***}	14.79 (3) ^{***}

^{***} $p \leq 0.01$.

Table 2. Means of values in four residential zones (new ideology).

Residential zone	Women: Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievement.	Family: This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family values.	Environment versus Jobs: Protecting the environment is more important than creating jobs.	Non-whites: It is more difficult for non-whites to be successful in Canadian society than it is for whites.	Aboriginals: It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Aboriginals would only try harder they could be just as well off as everyone else
	Strongly agree: 1 Somewhat agree: 2 Somewhat disagree: 3 Strongly disagree: 4 Mean (SD)	Strongly agree: 1 Somewhat agree: 2 Somewhat disagree: 3 Strongly disagree: 4 Mean (SD)	Strongly agree: 1 Somewhat agree: 2 Somewhat disagree: 3 Strongly disagree: 4 Mean (SD)	Strongly agree: 1 Somewhat agree: 2 Somewhat disagree: 3 Strongly disagree: 4 Mean (SD)	Strongly agree: 1 Somewhat agree: 2 Somewhat disagree: 3 Strongly disagree: 4 Mean (SD)
Inner city	2.38 (0.89), N = 1,766	2.77 (1.05), N = 1,765	2.32 (0.82), N = 1,764	2.41 (0.94), N = 1,764	2.92 (0.99), N = 1,762
Suburban	2.20 (0.87), N = 2,505	2.41 (1.01), N = 2,498	2.50 (0.81), N = 2,493	2.67 (0.95), N = 2,497	2.61 (1.00), N = 2,489
Small urban	2.17 (0.87), N = 1,619	2.27 (0.98), N = 1,616	2.49 (0.80), N = 1,615	2.72 (0.92), N = 1,614	2.48 (1.03), N = 1,611
Rural	2.18 (0.86), N = 2,104	2.23 (0.97), N = 2,095	2.49 (0.79), N = 2,091	2.76 (0.93), N = 2,102	2.49 (1.00), N = 2,100
All of Canada	2.24 (0.88), N = 8,063	2.40 (1.03), N = 8,043	2.45 (0.81), N = 8,030	2.62 (0.95), N = 8,046	2.66 (1.02), N = 8,031
F (df)	13.10 (3)***	20.77 (3)***	13.84 (3)***	33.72 (3)***	61.06 (3)***

***p ≤ 001.



Table 3. Means of "Should YOUR PROVINCIAL government spend more, less, or about the same as now in the following areas?".

Residential zone	Welfare		Health Care		K-12 Education		Environment		Crime and Justice	
	Spend more: 1 Spend about the same as now: 2 Spend less: 3 Mean (SD)	N	Spend more: 1 Spend about the same as now: 2 Spend less: 3 Mean (SD)	N	Spend more: 1 Spend about the same as now: 2 Spend less: 3 Mean (SD)	N	Spend more: 1 Spend about the same as now: 2 Spend less: 3 Mean (SD)	N	Spend more: 1 Spend about the same as now: 2 Spend less: 3 Mean (SD)	N
Inner city	1.95 (0.70)	1,750	1.48 (0.60)	1,754	1.55 (0.59)	1,753	1.59 (0.66)	1,751	1.99 (0.62)	1,752
Suburban	2.17 (0.70)	2,490	1.48 (0.61)	2,498	1.58 (0.58)	2,499	1.67 (0.68)	2,491	1.82 (0.64)	2,498
Small urban	2.17 (0.87)	1,619	1.41 (0.58)	1,617	1.58 (0.61)	1,619	1.73 (0.66)	1,615	1.81 (0.62)	1,617
Rural	2.18 (0.71)	2,101	1.52 (0.66)	2,111	1.58 (0.62)	2,106	1.72 (0.67)	2,103	1.82 (0.67)	2,104
All of Canada	2.12 (0.71)	8,026	1.48 (0.61)	8,049	1.57 (0.59)	8,046	1.66 (0.67)	8,029	1.87 (0.64)	8,040
F (df)	39.21 (3)		8.74 (3)		1.77 (3)		14.97 (3)		25.26 (3)	

*** $p \leq .001$.

Table 4. Means of taxation and regulation policy positions for four residential zones.

Residential zone	Personal Taxes: Should personal income taxes be increased, decreased or kept about the same as now? Increased: 1 Same: 2 Decreased: 3 Mean (SD)	Corporate Taxes: And corporate taxes, should they be increased, decreased, or kept about the same as now? Increased: 1 Same: 2 Decreased: 3 Mean (SD)	Taxing versus Spending: Please indicate where on this scale you would place yourself: 0 = Favors raising taxes to increase public services; 10 = Favors cutting public services to cut taxes. Mean (SD)	Moral Policies: Please indicate where on this scale you would place yourself: 0 = Favors more traditional policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia; 10 = Favors less traditional policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. Mean (SD)	Private Health: Please indicate where on this scale you would place yourself: 0 = Advocates that government should provide universal free health care; 10 = Advocates that medical expenses should be paid by individuals and private insurance plans. Mean (SD)
Inner city	2.12 (0.70), N = 1,757	1.50 (0.71), N = 1,747	4.69 (2.68), N = 1,658	6.50 (3.36), N = 1,670	2.85 (3.00), N = 1,497
Suburban	2.28 (0.63), N = 2,501	1.53 (0.68), N = 2,483	5.48 (2.65), N = 2,417	6.05 (3.29), N = 2,325	3.26 (2.99), N = 2,204
Small urban	2.27 (0.63), N = 1,616	1.50 (0.68), N = 1,608	5.19 (2.62), N = 1,548	6.01 (3.36), N = 1,517	3.10 (3.15), N = 1,394
Rural	2.34 (0.62), N = 2,111	1.49 (0.68), N = 2,086	5.29 (2.55), N = 2,018	5.56 (3.46), N = 1,992	3.20 (3.04), N = 1,854
All of Canada	2.25 (0.65), N = 8,055	1.51 (0.69), N = 7,994	5.20 (2.66), N = 7,707	6.10 (3.36), N = 7,596	3.12 (3.02), N = 7,009
F (df)	43.04 (3) ^{***}	5.64 (3) ^{***}	28.68 (3) ^{***}	20.21 (3) ^{***}	6.85 ^{***}

^{***} p ≤ 001.

residents are more likely to support maintaining or increasing personal tax levels and are more likely to agree to raise their taxes in exchange for better public services. The differences among the four residential zones are minimal on corporate taxes, reflecting a strong public consensus in favor of raising taxes on corporations. On questions of regulating public morality and allowing private health care, the divide between inner city dwellers and other Canadians is evident: inner city dwellers are more likely to favor less traditional moral policies and to support public universal health care than are Canadians living in other residential zones. However, it should be noted that the low means for all groups on the health care question depict a consensus in favor of universal public health care. The Scheffé tests indicate there are statistically significant differences between the means of the inner city and suburban groups on every indicator. Further, there are statistically significant differences between the means of the inner city group and the rural and small urban groups on three of the five questions (corporate taxes and private health being the exceptions). Rural residents are significantly different from all other groups with respect to moral policy, but beyond this there are only two statistically significant differences among the means of the suburban, small urban, and rural groups: suburban and small urban differ with respect to the health care and the tax-spend questions.

When we consider the twenty indicators together, it is notable how suburban, small urban, and rural residents group together to the right of the national average whereas inner city residents are consistently to the left. The Scheffé tests indicate that statistically significant differences are frequently found between the mean of the inner city groups and the means of the three other groups. Specifically, there is a statistically significant difference between the means of the inner city and suburban groups on eighteen out of the twenty indicators, and between the means of the inner city group and the means of the small urban group and rural group on fifteen out of the twenty indicators. On the other hand, statistically significant differences in the means of the suburban, small urban, and rural groups were not common. Taken together, the bivariate results suggest that the divide in Canadian politics is not between “big city” and “small city/rural” but between inner city residents and the rest of Canadians.

To what extent do these findings hold after we control for other variables? It is possible that suburban, small urban, and rural residents display certain right-wing attitudes compared to inner city residents due to a great concentration of homeowners, high-income earners, or religious people living those areas. To consider this question, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis.⁶ The independent variable of interest is residential zone; the categories suburban, small urban, and rural are included in the model, and the reference category is inner city. The multivariate analyses include several control variables: province, gender, age, education, income, religion, visible minority status, immigrant status, union membership, and renter/homeowner.⁷ The effects of these sociodemographic variables on values and policy preferences are well established in the literature on Canadian political culture.⁸

The multivariate results demonstrate that many of the differences between inner city residents and residents of other residential zones cease to exist once sociodemographic factors are controlled.⁹ Specifically, after other factors are controlled, the inner city versus all other Canadians pattern remains only for questions relating to new ideology values, regulation stifling personal drive, personal taxation, taxing versus spending, moral policies, and spending on social assistance. Further, the R^2 of these models is low, ranging from 0.05 to 0.22, indicating that there are other factors influencing the values and policy preferences of Canadians beyond residential zone and sociodemographic variables.

Looking first at old ideology values (Table 5), the “inner city versus all others” pattern is only found with respect to regulatory attitudes: after controlling for other sociodemographic variables, Canadians from the suburban, small urban, and rural residential zones are more likely than inner city residents to agree that government regulation stifles personal drive. The residential zones do not differ significantly when it comes to the pro-business and pro-union variables. The multivariate analyses reveal two instances where suburbanites and small urban residents varied in their attitudes: compared to inner city residents, suburbanites are more likely to agree that people who do not succeed should blame themselves, and compared to inner city residents, small urban residents are less likely to agree that the government should ensure that every citizen has a decent standard of living.

Table 5. Values of four residential zones (old ideology).

	Pro-Business		Pro-Union		Regulation		Blame Themselves		Standard of Living	
	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta
Suburban ^a	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03	0.13 (0.05)	0.07	-0.23 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.12	-0.16 (0.04) ^{***}	0.05 (0.04)	0.03	
Small urban ^a	-0.27 (0.06)	-0.01	0.06 (0.07)	0.02	-0.24 (0.07) ^{***}	-0.09	-0.07 (0.06)	0.13 (0.05) ^{**}	0.05	
Rural ^a	0.02 (0.05)	0.008	0.07 (0.06)	0.03	-0.33 (0.07) ^{***}	-0.13	-0.10 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.04	
NL ^b	-0.20 (0.06) ^{***}	0	-0.39 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.05	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.006	-0.12 (0.06) [*]	-0.29 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.04	
PEI ^b	-0.14 (0.07)	-0.01	-0.25 (0.08) ^{**}	-0.02	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.003	0.13 (0.07)	-0.21 (0.07) ^{**}	0.02	
NS ^b	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.02	-0.17 (0.06) ^{**}	-0.03	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.02	0.16 (0.06) ^{**}	-0.21 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.04	
QC ^b	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.007	-0.21 (0.07) ^{***}	-0.04	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.02	0.14 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.02	
NB ^b	-0.19 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.10	-0.19 (0.06)	-0.07	-0.24 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.12	-0.34 (0.05) ^{***}	0.08 (0.05)	0.04	
MB ^b	-0.15 (0.06) ^{**}	-0.04	-0.15 (0.06)	-0.04	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.009	-0.24 (0.05) ^{***}	0.23 (0.06) ^{***}	0.05	
SK ^b	0.21 (0.05) ^{***}	0.04	0.08 (0.06)	0.002	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.0005	-0.20 (0.06) ^{***}	0.04 (0.06)	0.008	
AB ^b	-0.19 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.07	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.02	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.007	-0.21 (0.05) ^{***}	0.21 (0.06) ^{***}	0.08	
BC ^b	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.05	-0.30 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.10	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.02	-0.09 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	0.01	
Female	0.09 (0.04) [*]	0.05	-0.14 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.07	0.15 (0.04) ^{***}	0.09	0.20 (0.04) ^{***}	0.03 (0.05)	0.01	
Age	-0.00009 (0.0002) ^{***}	-0.05	-0.00007 (0.0004) [*]	-0.03	0.00008 (0.00007)	0.03	-0.00001 (0.00002)	-0.22 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.13	
Education	0.03 (0.009) ^{**}	0.07	-0.03 (0.009) ^{***}	-0.08	0.08 (0.009) ^{***}	0.20	0.07 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.0009)	-0.01	
Income	-0.04 (0.006) ^{***}	0.10	0.03 (0.006) ^{***}	0.10	-0.08 (0.007)	-0.03	-0.03 (0.006) ^{***}	0.03 (0.006) ^{***}	0.13	
Catholic ^c	-0.20 (0.05) ^{***}	0.10	0.13 (0.05) ^{**}	0.06	-0.26 (0.05) ^{**}	-0.13	-0.18 (0.05) ^{**}	0.11 (0.04) ^{**}	0.01	
Protestant ^c	-0.29 (0.05) ^{***}	0.15	0.13 (0.05) ^{**}	0.06	-0.26 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.13	-0.23 (0.06) ^{***}	0.18 (0.05) ^{***}	0.09	
Other religion ^c	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.02	0.07 (0.06)	0.03	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.05	-0.09 (0.06) ^{***}	0.02 (0.05)	0.01	
Visible minority	0.007 (0.09)	0.002	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.01	0.15 (0.09)	0.04	0.08 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.03	
Foreign born	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.02	0.05 (0.07)	0.13	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.03	-0.01 (0.06)	0.001 (0.06)	0.004	
Union	0.27 (0.06) ^{***}	0.13	-0.63 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.26	0.12 (0.05) ^{**}	0.05	0.19 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.13 (0.04) ^{**}	-0.06	
Constant	3.01 (0.09) ^{***}	-	2.77 (0.006) ^{***}	-	2.51 (0.09) ^{***}	-	2.31 (0.09) ^{***}	1.75 (0.08) ^{***}	-	
R ²	0.08	-	0.12	-	0.11	-	0.10	0.09	-	
N	6,750	-	6,683	-	6,775	-	6,797	6,804	-	

^aInner city; ^bOntario; ^cNo religion.
 Source: Comparative Provincial Election Study.
^{***}p ≤ 0.01; ^{**}p ≤ 0.05; ^{*}p ≤ 0.05.

The residential zone differences are more robust with respect to new ideology values (Table 6). All three residential zones have statistically significant differences from the inner city reference category on each question. When it comes to values related to new ideology, it is evident that inner city residents lean more to the left than residents of suburbs, small urban areas, and rural areas. After controlling for other sociodemographic variables, inner city residents are less likely to believe in traditional family values and more likely to recognize the existence of systematic racism against Aboriginals and nonwhites. The residential zone variables are also important to understanding attitudes concerning gender equality and the trade-off between the environment and economic growth: inner city residents are less likely than other Canadians to believe that women currently have equal opportunities in society and are more likely to believe that protecting the environment is more important than creating jobs.

Turning to spending priorities, we find that in four out of the five policy areas, the inner city versus all other Canadians pattern does not persist in the multivariate analysis (Table 7). After controlling for other variables, the residential zones do not differ significantly when it comes to the prioritization of health and education spending. Small urban residents are more likely than inner city residents to want to spend less on the environment, whereas suburbanites and rural residents do not differ significantly from the inner city residents on this item. Suburbanites are more enthusiastic than inner city dwellers about spending on crime and justice, but there are no statistically significant differences found between inner city residents and small urban and rural residents on this question. The only spending priority question that exhibits the inner city versus all others pattern after controlling for other sociodemographic variables is social assistance spending: inner city residents are more likely to want to spend *more* or *about the same* on social assistance policy than are residents of suburbs, small urban, and rural areas.

Finally, the questions concerning taxation, moral policies, and private health care (Table 8) also reveal that some of the residential zone differences can be explained by sociodemographic variations. Given the results of the multivariate analysis of new ideology values, it is not surprising that inner city residents are to the left of other Canadians on issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia, even after controlling for sociodemographic variables. It is striking, however, that the divide between inner city residents and other Canadians persists on two of the questions related to taxation: after controlling for other sociodemographic variables, inner city residents are more likely than other Canadians to be in favor of increasing or keeping personal taxes the same and increasing taxes in exchange for better public services. There is clearly not the same appetite for tax cuts within inner city areas as there is in suburban, small urban, and rural areas of Canada. Corporate taxation is different story, as Canadians living in all four residential zones appear to agree on the appropriate level of corporation taxation. There is also a consensus among residents of the four residential zones concerning private versus public health care provision. These findings reinforce the bivariate results that depict a pan-Canadian consensus in terms of raising corporate taxes and support for universal public health care.

Conclusion: Implications of findings

The data presented in this article suggest that, for political analyses, now may be the time to move away from using urban as a catch-all category for city dwellers, as this category has become increasingly fractured as a concept for analytical use. Using evidence from Canada, this article takes a step in this direction by hypothesizing that Western populations live in four separate residential zones—inner city, suburban, small urban, and rural—and by testing the extent to which the political values and policy preferences vary among these residential zones.

As Walks' research suggests, inner city residents are generally more left of center than are suburban residents. Moreover, the values and policy preferences of suburban residents are aligned with those of small urban and rural residents, particularly on questions of new ideology. The level of congruence between suburbanites and residents of small urban and rural areas when compared to

Table 6. Values of four residential zones (new ideology).

	Women		Family		Environment vs. Jobs		Non-Whites		Aboriginal	
	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta
Suburban ^a	-0.16 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.08	-0.27 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.13	0.14 (0.04) ^{***}	0.09	0.23 (0.05) ^{***}	0.12	-0.24 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.12
Small urban ^a	-0.18 (0.06) ^{**}	-0.07	-0.32 (0.07) ^{***}	-0.10	0.16 (0.05) ^{**}	0.06	0.22 (0.07) ^{***}	0.08	-0.30 (0.07) ^{***}	-0.10
Rural ^a	-0.14 (0.05) ^{**}	-0.06	-0.28 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.10	0.10 (0.05) ^{**}	0.05	0.25 (0.07) ^{***}	0.10	-0.26 (0.07) ^{***}	-0.10
NL ^b	-0.18 (0.05) ^{**}	-0.02	-0.29 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.03	0.07 (0.05) ^{**}	0.01	0.17 (0.06) ^{**}	0.02	-0.16 (0.06) ^{**}	-0.02
PEI ^b	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.002	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.003	-0.21 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.02	0.009 (0.08)	0.0005	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.01
NS ^b	0.02 (0.06)	0.004	-0.22 (0.07) ^{***}	-0.04	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.005	0.05 (0.07)	0.009	-0.15 (0.07) [*]	-0.02
NB ^b	0.10 (0.06)	0.02	-0.29 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.05	-0.21 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.04	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.008	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.02
QC ^b	-0.55 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.27	-0.29 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.12	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.04	0.01 (0.06)	0.0006	-0.44 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.19
MB ^b	0.20 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.04	-0.25 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.05	0.06 (0.05) ^{**}	0.01	0.16 (0.07) ^{**}	0.03	-0.50 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.09
SK ^b	-0.13 (0.53) ^{**}	-0.03	-0.34 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.06	-0.004 (0.05)	-0.0008	0.10 (0.06)	0.02	-0.45 (0.07) ^{***}	-0.07
AB ^b	-0.21 (0.06) ^{**}	-0.07	-0.20 (0.06) ^{**}	-0.06	0.06 (0.05) ^{**}	0.02	0.22 (0.07) ^{***}	0.07	-0.37 (0.06) ^{***}	-0.11
BC ^b	-0.17 (0.06) ^{**}	-0.06	0.04 (0.07)	0.01	-0.20 (0.05) ^{**}	-0.08	0.13 (0.06) ^{**}	0.04	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.02
Female	0.39 (0.03) ^{***}	0.22	0.10 (0.04) [*]	0.05	-0.08 (0.03) ^{**}	-0.05	-0.14 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.07	0.25 (0.04) ^{***}	0.12
Age	-0.00001 (0.00002)	-0.006	-0.00009 ^{***} (0.00002)	-0.03	0.00004 (0.00002)	0.02	-0.00007 0.00006	-0.03	-0.00007 ^{**} (0.00002)	-0.03
Education	0.05 (0.009) ^{***}	0.13	0.12 (0.01) ^{***}	0.25	-0.03 (0.008) ^{***}	-0.09	-0.07 (0.01) ^{***}	-0.15	0.13 (0.01) ^{***}	0.27
Income	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.02	0.01 (0.007)	0.03	0.007 (0.006)	0.03	0.01 (0.05)	0.004	-0.02 (0.007) ^{**}	-0.06
Catholic ^c	-0.21 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.11	-0.59 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.25	0.27 (0.04) ^{***}	0.15	0.22 (0.05) ^{***}	0.10	-0.37 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.16
Protestant ^c	-0.22 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.11	-0.69 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.29	0.27 (0.04) ^{***}	0.015	0.12 (0.05) [*]	0.05	-0.29 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.12
Other religion ^c	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.02	-0.40 (0.07) ^{***}	-0.14	0.08 (0.05) ^{**}	0.04	0.15 (0.07) ^{**}	0.06	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.05
Visible minority	0.005 (0.08)	0.001	-0.15 (0.09)	0.03	0.07 (0.08)	0.02	-0.41 (0.10) ^{***}	-0.10	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.003
Foreign born	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.02	-0.22 (0.08) ^{**}	-0.07	0.007 (0.05)	0.003	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.02	-0.14 (0.07) ^{**}	-0.05
Union	0.07 (0.04)	0.03	0.14 (0.05) ^{**}	0.05	-0.14 (0.04) ^{**}	-0.07	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.006	0.06 (0.05)	0.03
Renter	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01	0.07 (0.05)	0.03	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02	0.01 (0.05)	0.004	0.03 (0.06)	0.01
Constant	2.26 (0.08) ^{***}	-	2.55 (0.10) ^{***}	-	2.40 (0.08) ^{***}	-	2.63 (0.09) ^{***}	-	2.64 (0.09) ^{***}	-
R ²	0.15	-	0.22	-	0.07	-	0.08	-	0.17	-
N	6,798	-	6,783	-	6,781	-	6,788	-	6,777	-

^aInner city; ^bOntario; ^cNo religion
 Source: Comparative Provincial Election Study
 ***: $p \leq 0.01$; **: $p \leq 0.05$.

Table 7. Spending priorities of four residential zones.

	Welfare		Health Care		K-12 Education		Environment		Crime and Justice	
	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta
Suburban ^a	0.15 (0.04) ^{***}	0.10	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.007	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03	0.05 (0.04)	0.03	-0.15 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.12
Small urban ^a	0.21 (0.05) ^{***}	0.10	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.06	0.03 (0.04)	0.02	0.14 (0.05) ^{**}	0.07	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.04
Rural ^a	0.12 (0.05) ^{**}	0.06	0.06 (0.05)	0.04	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02	0.05 (0.05)	0.28	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.05
NL ^b	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.01	-0.27 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.05	-0.38 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.08	-0.15 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.03	-0.38 (0.04) [*]	-0.07
PEI ^b	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.008	-0.23 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.02	-0.22 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.02	-0.29 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.03	-0.13 (0.06) [*]	-0.01
NS ^b	0.02 (0.05)	0.005	-0.18 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.05	-0.31 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.09	-0.09 (0.05) ^{**}	-0.02	-0.24 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.06
NB ^b	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.01	-0.07 (0.04) [*]	-0.02	-0.26 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.07	-0.15 (0.05) ^{**}	-0.04	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.01
QC ^b	0.21 (0.05) ^{***}	0.12	-0.09 (0.04) [*]	-0.07	-0.16 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.12	-0.04 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.03	-0.26 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.18
MB ^b	0.22 (0.05) ^{***}	0.06	-0.06 (0.04) [*]	-0.02	-0.15 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.05	0.05 (0.05)	0.02	-0.51 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.15
SK ^b	0.05 (0.05)	0.01	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.02	-0.20 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.06	-0.03 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.008	-0.27 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.07
AB ^b	0.007 (0.04)	0.00	0.07 (0.05)	0.04	-0.17 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.09	-0.02 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.01	-0.24 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.11
BC ^b	-0.20 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.09	-0.13 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.07	-0.31 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.17	-0.20 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.09	-0.20 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.10
Female	-0.11 (0.03)	-0.08	-0.20 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.16	-0.12 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.10	-0.16 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.12	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03
Age	-0.00001 (0.00001)	-0.003	0.00003 (0.00002) [*]	0.02	0.00002 (0.00001) [*]	0.01	0.00005 (0.00002) [*]	0.03	-0.00008 (0.00002) ^{***}	-0.05
Education	-0.04 (0.008) ^{***}	-0.11	0.02 (0.007) ^{***}	0.08	-0.02 (0.007) ^{***}	-0.08	-0.05 (0.007) ^{***}	-0.16	0.05 (0.006)	0.16
Income	0.03 (0.005)	0.13	0.01 (0.005) [*]	0.06	0.006 (0.005)	0.03	0.01 (0.005) ^{**}	0.06	0.001 (0.005)	0.007
Catholic ^c	0.14 (0.04) ^{***}	0.09	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01	0.06 (0.03)	0.04	0.20 (0.04) ^{***}	0.13	-0.19 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.13
Protestant ^c	0.13 (0.04) ^{***}	0.08	0.02 (0.04)	0.01	0.12 (0.03) ^{***}	0.09	0.23 (0.04) ^{***}	0.15	-0.18 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.12
Other religion ^c	0.03 (0.05)	0.01	0.05 (0.04)	0.03	0.06 (0.04)	0.04	0.07 (0.04)	0.04	-0.07 (0.04) [*]	-0.04
Visible minority	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.03	-0.18 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.07	-0.21 (0.06)	-0.09	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.04	-0.15 (0.06) [*]	-0.05
Foreign born	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.006	0.009 (0.04)	0.005	0.06 (0.04)	0.03	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.03
Union	0.01 (0.03)	0.006	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02	-0.16 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.10	-0.12 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.07	0.05 (0.03)	0.03
Renter	-0.13 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.08	-0.07 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.05	-0.13 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.09	-0.09 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.06	-0.003 (0.04) ^{***}	-0.002
Constant	1.98 (0.07) ^{***}	-	1.49 (0.06) ^{***}	-	1.85 (0.005) ^{***}	-	1.80 (0.07) ^{***}	-	2.03 (0.06) ^{***}	-
R ²	0.10	-	0.07	-	0.10	-	0.10	-	0.12	-
N	6,773	-	6,788	-	6,787	-	6,773	-	6,780	-

^aInner city; ^bOntario; ^cNo religion.

Source: Comparative Provincial Election Study.

***: $p \leq 0.01$; **: $p \leq 0.05$.

Table 8. Policy positions of four residential zones (taxes, moral policies, and private health care).

	Personal Taxes		Corporate Taxes		Taxes versus Spending		Private Health Care		Moral Policies	
	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta	b (SE)	Beta
Suburban ^a	0.13 (0.04)***	0.09	0.03 (0.04)	0.02	0.62 (0.15)***	0.12	0.23 (0.16)	0.04	-0.37 (0.17)*	-0.05
Small urban ^a	0.13 (0.05)	0.07	0.04 (0.05)	0.02	0.45 (0.19)*	0.06	0.24 (0.23)	0.03	-0.20 (0.25)*	-0.02
Rural ^a	0.15 (0.04)***	0.09	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02	0.38 (0.18)*	0.05	0.21 (0.21)	0.03	-0.55 (0.22)*	-0.06
NL ^b	0.10 (0.04)	0.02	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.002	-0.53 (0.18)**	-0.02	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.003	-0.21 (0.20)	-0.007
PEI ^b	0.07 (0.05)	0.007	0.003 (0.06)	0.003	-0.27 (0.22)	-0.006	-0.06 (0.30)	-0.001	-0.29 (0.28)	-0.005
NS ^b	0.11 (0.05)	0.03	0.08 (0.05)	0.02	-0.05 (0.18)	-0.003	-0.16 (0.23)	-0.01	-0.04 (0.22)	-0.002
NB ^b	-0.17 (0.05)***	-0.04	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.02	-0.32 (0.20)	-0.02	-0.26 (0.22)	-0.02	-0.05 (0.32)	-0.002
QC ^b	0.10 (0.04)	0.07	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.008	0.22 (0.18)	0.04	0.83 (0.20)	0.12	-2.31 (0.21)***	-0.30
MB ^b	0.04 (0.05)	0.01	0.11 (0.05)**	0.03	0.13 (0.18)	0.01	0.34 (0.23)	0.02	-0.50 (0.22)*	-0.03
SK ^b	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.003	0.07 (0.05)	0.02	-0.26 (0.17)	-0.02	0.30 (0.22)	0.02	-0.91 (0.21)***	-0.04
AB ^b	-0.15 (0.05)***	-0.07	0.06 (0.05)	0.03	-0.44 (0.17)**	-0.05	0.31 (0.21)	0.03	-0.37 (0.20)	-0.03
BC ^b	0.12 (0.04)	-0.06	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03	-0.43 (0.16)**	-0.05	-0.11 (0.21)	-0.01	0.45 (0.21)*	0.04
Female	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03	-0.15 (0.03)***	-0.11	-0.66 (0.11)***	-0.12	-0.57 (0.13)***	-0.10	0.40 (0.13)**	0.06
Age	0.00003 (0.00004)	0.02	0.00002 (0.00001)	0.01	-0.0002 (0.00001)	-0.02	0.0001 (0.00001)	0.01	-0.0001 (0.00006)	-0.02
Education	-0.05 (0.007)***	-0.17	-0.02 (0.008)**	-0.07	-0.12 (0.03)***	-0.10	0.006 (0.03)	0.004	0.16 (0.03)***	0.10
Income	0.004 (0.005)	0.02	0.02 (0.005)**	0.08	0.03 (0.02)	0.04	0.09 (0.02)	0.09	0.05 (0.02)*	0.05
Catholic ^c	0.22 (0.04)***	0.15	0.12 (0.04)**	0.08	0.80 (0.15)***	0.13	0.66 (0.17)***	0.10	-0.51 (0.19)**	-0.07
Protestant ^c	0.16 (0.04)***	0.10	0.20 (0.04)***	0.13	0.88 (0.15)***	0.15	0.93 (0.18)***	0.14	-1.25 (0.17)***	-0.16
Other religion ^c	0.13 (0.04)**	0.07	0.09 (0.05)	0.05	0.51 (0.17)**	0.07	0.48 (0.21)**	0.06	-0.56 (0.21)**	-0.06
Visible minority	0.03 (0.07)	0.01	-0.14 (0.07)	-0.005	-0.61 (0.26)*	-0.05	0.22 (0.32)	0.02	0.29 (0.30)	0.02
Foreign born	0.10 (0.05)	0.05	0.08 (0.06)	0.04	0.10 (0.21)	0.01	0.004 (0.25)	0.0004	-0.14 (0.21)	-0.01
Union	-0.08 (0.03)*	-0.05	-0.23 (0.03)***	-0.13	-0.49 (0.14)***	-0.07	-0.35 (0.17)*	-0.05	0.22 (0.15)	0.26
Renter	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.03	0.007 (0.04)	0.004	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.03	-0.24 (0.18)	-0.03	0.09 (0.18)	0.01
Constant	2.25 (0.07)***	-	1.51 (0.005)***	-	5.22 (0.29)***	-	2.01 (0.02)	-	6.28 (0.32)***	-
R ²	0.09	-	0.06	-	0.08	-	0.05	-	0.12	-
N	6,794	-	6,748	-	6,516	-	5,948	-	6,447	-

^a Inner City; ^b Ontario; ^c No religion.
 Source: Comparative Provincial Election Study.
 *** $p \leq 0.01$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; * $p \leq 0.1$.

inner city residents is striking, and such an alignment would not be possible to discern if suburban residents were lumped into a single urban category along with inner city residents. Simply put, an inner city/suburban cleavage exists within large Canadian cities and it is quite unwise to continue to use traditional measurements that fail to capture it.

At the same time, it must be noted that replacing the binary urban/rural distinction with a four-residential-zone approach does not eliminate the importance of a respondent's province or region in shaping values and policy preferences. As the tables illustrate, in many instances the relative effect (as measured by the betas) of residential zone was comparable to the relative effect of living within certain provinces. Whereas past analyses of Canadian values, vote choice, and policy preference have placed a binary urban/rural variable alongside the province or region of the respondent, we propose that researchers consider using the more robust definition of residential zone alongside province or region of residence, as doing so will allow the researcher to discern important patterns with respect to geography and political phenomena.

It should be stressed that many of the differences in political values and policy preferences across residential zones reflect sociodemographic differences, because individuals self-select (due to capacity and preference) their areas of residence. Indeed, once sociodemographic variables are controlled, some of the differences between the residential zones cease to be statistically significant. However, it is striking that even after controlling for sociodemographic variables, an ideological polarization remains between inner city residents on the left and the rest of Canadians when it comes to values related to new ideology and policy preferences concerning personal taxation, social assistance spending, and moral policies. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the causal determinants of these differences, and therefore future research should consider the source of inner city uniqueness regarding new ideology and policy preferences in these three areas.

While the policy preferences and political values of small urban residents were not found to be particularly distinctive, this article expands upon previous research by testing the possibility that they may have different attitudes than citizens living in the other residential zones. Although more research is needed to confirm that the small urban category is really undistinguishable from the rural and suburban category, the finding that small urban residents were not very distinctive raises some interesting questions. What could cause a congruence of political values and policy preferences across these three groups that live in such different residential environments? Why is it that the differences in experiences between, for example, living in a Toronto suburb and living on a farm outside of Oxbow, Saskatchewan fail to create differences in political attitudes? It is clearly beyond the scope of this article to uncover the causal determinants driving variations in political attitudes, but our research does point to some interesting queries for future analysis.

Given the insights from the literature on Canadian political attitudes and vote choice, it was surprising that we found no evidence that suburbanites in Canada are socially progressive and economically conservative. If anything, the opposite is true. New ideology considerations are driving the division between suburbanites and inner city residents. Suburbanites are more socially conservative than inner city residents, while divisions between the two groups are less striking when it comes to economic issues or the welfare state. The implications of this finding for urban politics in Canada are twofold. First, the ideological distance between suburbanites and inner city dwellers is not as vast as differences in voting patterns would lead us to believe. There appears to be room for agreement between these two sets of citizens on issues involving state intervention in the economy and the appropriate generosity of social programs. Second, issues concerning race, gender, and morality may have more potential to ignite disagreements between residents of the suburbs and the inner city than economic issues. When considering policy that touches on these new ideology considerations, politicians should be aware of the potential divisions that could emerge between their inner city and suburban constituents.

The cohesiveness of political values and policy preferences of suburban, small urban, and rural areas suggests that if there is a binary residential zone difference, it is between inner city and non-inner city, rather than urban and rural. At first glance, this conclusion would appear to confirm the

provocative thesis of *The Big Shift* by Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson that the Conservatives won the 2011 Canadian federal election because they “convinced a plurality of voters in suburban Ontario that they shared the same values, values that were traditionally associated with rural voters or voters in the Prairies” (2013, pp. 32–33). However, Bricker and Ibbitson argue that this electoral alliance of suburban voters with voters of small cities and rural areas was bound together by “economic conservatism” (2013, p. 36). Our data, in contrast, suggest that agreement on new ideology considerations like gender, race, and social conservatism is more likely to be the cement of an electoral coalition between suburbanites and Canadians living in rural areas and small towns. To the extent that there is a values disagreement between inner city residents and the rest of Canadians on economic conservatism, it is limited to attitudes towards personal taxation and the generosity of social assistance. To the extent that values shape vote choice, Bricker and Ibbitson may have misidentified the foundation of the Conservatives’ electoral strength in the 2011 federal election.

Walks (2004, 2005, 2006) was the first Canadian researcher to break away from using the traditional urban/rural cleavage and to differentiate between the political attitudes of suburban and inner city residents. Building on his work, and using a data set that encompasses all Canadian provinces and allows for a larger number of measurements of ideology, we confirm his finding that differences exist in the political attitudes of inner city residents and suburbanites. Indeed, the situation appears to be more nuanced than Walks suggests, as our data suggest that the division between inner city and suburban areas is most pronounced when it comes to new ideology values and less pronounced when it comes to old ideology values or policy preferences relating to the welfare state. Further, our expansion on Walks’ work through the introduction of small urban and rural residential zones provides a more fulsome understanding of the relationship between residential zone and political attitudes. Interestingly, suburbanites are found to be more similar to small urban and rural residents than to inner city residents on many important political topics. Overall, our findings question the contemporary validity of assuming that an urban/rural dichotomy is one of the main cleavages driving attitudinal differences among citizens of western societies. Given the complexities of contemporary urban environments and the internal value differences that they may be producing, analysts should adopt more nuanced approaches to understanding the intersection between place of residence and politics.

Notes

1. Canadian research has been particularly interested in the question of how place of residence correlates with citizens’ political values and policy preferences, and has considered urban/rural differences as well as differences with respect to province or region (i.e., blocs of geographically contiguous provinces). The appropriateness of including measurements relating to province and region when examining political values and policy preferences is beyond the scope of this study.
2. It is important to note that policy preferences and political values do not automatically align with vote choice. Voting behavior research (Canadian examples include Clarke et al., 2009 and Gidengil et al., 2012) has demonstrated that ideology (political values) and policy preferences are only one component in understanding why voters vote for particular parties, and that in some situations such considerations have only limited impact on vote choice.
3. Geocoding is the process of assigning an absolute geographic location (latitude and longitude) based on a complete or partial address.
4. Abacus Data Research administered the Comparative Provincial Election Project (CPEP) in the weeks immediately after each province’s provincial election: Newfoundland and Labrador 12–30 October 2011 ($n = 851$); Prince Edward Island 4–25 October 2011 ($n = 509$); Ontario 7–31 October 2011 ($n = 1,044$); Manitoba 5–31 October 2011 ($n = 775$); Saskatchewan 8–21 November 2011 ($n = 821$); Alberta 25 April–15 May 2012 ($n = 897$); Quebec 5–29 September 2012 ($n = 1009$); British Columbia May 15–29 2013 ($n = 803$); Nova Scotia 9–30 October 2013 ($n = 797$); New Brunswick 23 September–15 October 2014 ($n = 657$).
5. For a full definition of Statistics Canada’s concepts of Census Metropolitan Area and Census Agglomeration see Statistics Canada, “Census Metropolitan Area and Census Agglomeration definitions,” <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/93-600-x/2010000/definitions-eng.htm>, accessed 18 September 2014.
6. OLS regression is used due to the ease of interpretation. Ordered logit regression analysis resulted in substantively similar findings. Results available from the authors upon request.

7. The coding for the sociodemographic variables: province (dummy variables for British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador with Ontario as the reference category); sex (female = 1, male = 0), age in years, years of education (0 = less than high school diploma, 8 = professional degree/doctorate), income (0 = less than \$20,000, 10 = over \$100,000); religious affiliation (Catholic, Protestant, other religion, with no affiliation/atheist as the reference category); visible minority (1 = visible minority, 0 = not visible minority); foreign-born (1 = foreign-born, 0 = Canada-born); union membership (1 = union member, 0 = non-union member); renter (1 = renter; 0 = owner).
8. Work on provincial political culture in Canada argues that province of residence is a key variable to understanding a citizen's tendency to adopt left-wing and right-wing positions in terms of both old and new ideology (Anderson, 2011; Cochrane & Perrella, 2013; Schwartz, 1974; Simeon & Elkins, 1980). There have been discussions of the effect of gender and immigrant status on the values and policy positions of Canadians (Bilodeau et al., 2010; O'Neill, 2002). Various researchers also have pointed to clusters of Canadians sharing political values and policy positions based upon commonalities such as education, age, religion, and visible minority status (Cutler & Jenkins, 2002; Gidengil, 1990; Henderson, 2004; MacDermid, 1990). Researchers tending towards class analysis have focused on the effects of variables related to income and owning property when examining Canadians' ideology (Ornstein et al., 1980; Ornstein & Stevenson, 1999).
9. In order to fully understand the relationships between the variables that we were examining, we also ran a model with a small number of sociodemographic variables (residential zone, province, gender, age, education, and income); results available from authors upon request. The key relationships of interest persist in the more parsimonious model.

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